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RESPONSE
Where Do You Get Off?
A Reply to Courting Failure's Critics
LYNN M. LoPUCKIt
INTRODUCTION
Bill Whitford started me on a career-long series of
studies of large public company reorganizations. He and I
worked together on the first studies in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Bill also came up with the idea for this
conference and symposium, recruited an illustrious group of
scholars, and persuaded them to write the wonderful set of
papers published here and travel to Madison to present
them. Particularly in their opening paragraphs, the papers
contain dozens of warm and generous compliments on both
Courting Failure and my earlier work. For all of that, I am
deeply appreciative.
This symposium is, however, no festschrift. The
comments contain a plethora of complaints about Courting
Failure, ranging from my use of the C word to the empirical
methods of my research. As I grumbled to Charles Tabb
about it, he reminded me of the story of a man who, tarred
and feathered and ridden out of town on a rail, remarked
"were it not for the honor of the thing, I would have
preferred to walk." My sentiments exactly.
t Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Email:
Lopucki@law.ucla.edu. I thank Bob Rasmussen and Elizabeth Warren for
helpful comments on this paper.
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I. WHERE Do You GET OFF?
With so much smoke in the air, it would be easy to
conclude that Courting Failure had burned to the ground.
Most of the complaints, however, bear only indirectly on the
Courting Failure thesis that has most inflamed the critics:
bankruptcy courts are competing for cases and that
competition is corrupting the courts.
The argument that proves the thesis is simple,
straightforward, and, I continue to believe, irrefutable. At
each of the four steps of the argument, the evidence is
overwhelming. The reader who cannot get off the argument
at one of these four steps logically is stuck with the
distasteful conclusion that court competition is corrupting
the bankruptcy courts.
A. Step 1: Bankruptcy Judges Are Under Substantial
Pressure to Attract Cases
No one seriously disputes that a substantial number of
bankruptcy judges want big cases. In response to questions
from Professor Marcus Cole, "[a]lmost all of the judges
suggested that there is a level of prestige and satisfaction
that attaches to hearing and deciding important cases....
'Big Chapter 11 cases are interesting as well as
prestigious.""
Nor does anyone dispute the fact that in the period
after 1996, lawyers approached bankruptcy judges in nearly
every major city requesting action to stem the outflow of
cases. Judges appointed committees, committees reported,
and judges took action.2
In every multi-judge panel but Delaware, cases are
distributed among panel members by random draw.
Lawyers and judges agree that one "bad" judge can drive
cases away, regardless of the quality of the panel as a
whole. Lawyers and judges alike refer to the judges who
drive cases away as "toxic."
1. Marcus Cole, 'Delaware is Not a State" Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1875 (2002).
2. See LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRuPTcY COURTS 125-27 (2005) (describing the
process).
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Bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to such pressure, in
part because they are not Article III judges. The circuit
appoints them for 14 year terms. To be reappointed,
bankruptcy judges know that they will need support from
the lawyers who practice before them. Of those who apply
for reappointment, 8% are denied and a larger number are,
as one judge put it, "put through the wringer."3 The process
is every bit as intimidating-and closely analogous to-the
tenure process in a law school. Bankruptcy judges who will
seek reappointment have just as much reason to be
solicitous of the views of case placers as untenured law
faculty have to be solicitous of the views of tenured
members of their faculties.
Nowhere is the pressure on bankruptcy judges from the
necessity to compete for big cases more apparent than in
Delaware. Delaware has a population of only about 800,000
people. The number of home-grown bankruptcies in
Delaware is insufficient to warrant even a single full-time
bankruptcy judge. 4  The business of the Delaware
bankruptcy court comes to it from outside the state, in the
form of forum shopping by large public companies.
In March of 2002, congressional leaders decided to
award the two-judge Delaware bankruptcy court four
additional judges. They made that decision at the height of
the big-case bankruptcy boom, at a time when Delaware
had more than enough cases to justify the award. Before the
bill awarding the judges was even enacted, the boom
subsided. Filings by large public companies are at about
one-fourth their prior level. 5 The largest of the companies
3. Stan Bernstein, The Reappointment of Bankruptcy Judges: A
Preliminary Analysis of the Present Process (Oct. 15, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
4. Only 3,597 bankruptcy cases were filed in the district of Delaware during
the year ended June 30, 2005. See Table F, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Bankruptcy
Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the Twelve Month Periods
Ended June 30, 2004 and 2005, http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/
bankrupt-ftablejun2005.xls (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). About 1.6 million
bankruptcy cases are filed annually in the United States. Id. They are divided
among approximately 400 bankruptcy judges. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)
(authorizing 316 bankruptcy judges). Thus, United States bankruptcy judges
have, on average, more than 4,000 cases per judge.
5. Ninety-seven large public company bankruptcy cases were filed in 2001.
The corresponding figure for 2005 is twenty-five. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy
Research Database (2005), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu.
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filing in the past year have unanimously chosen the New
York court over the Delaware court.6 The Delaware court no
longer has the large public company filings to justify the
court's new judges or to keep them busy.
It seems a fair presumption that the four new judges
sought the job in the hopes of presiding over large public
company bankruptcies. For their hopes to be fulfilled, the
new judges are going to have to entice bankruptcies away
from other courts-courts that have already adopted the last
generation of Delaware rules and practices. The future of
dozens of lawyers and law firms that have invested in
establishing Delaware offices-and put their trust in those
four judges by elevating them to office-is also at stake. To
deny that this puts substantial pressure on those four
judges is to stick one's head in the sand.
B. Step 2: Some Judges Changed Substantive Rules and
Rulings to Attract Cases
No one disputes that a massive change has taken place
in bankruptcy court practices since Delaware's ascendancy. 7
These changes occurred without any change in statutes or
appellate decisions. The list of these changes includes (1)
higher professional fees, paid earlier, and paid before court
review, (2) fewer trustee appointments, (3) deference to
6. Those companies are Northwest Airlines, Delta Airlines, Refco, Delphi,
and Calpine.
7. E.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Words that Wound: Defining, Discussing, and
Defeating Bankruptcy "Corruption," 54 BUFF. L. REV. 365, 368 (2006) ("[Flew
would dispute that large Chapter 11 cases now are different from the ones
originally envisioned by Congress."); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K.
Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685 (2003) (referring
to the "magnitude of what has changed" and "the need to explore why this
change has taken place."); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 24-25 (2004) ("[A] number of phenomena and tactics ...
especially in large corporate cases ... have been very effective at allowing
secured creditors capitalizing upon agency problems to gain the help of insiders
and insolvency professionals to effectively take over-or "hijack"-the chapter
11 process and essentially create a federal unified foreclosure process."); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter
11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921 (2003) ("In most large cases, the same creditors
who seemed so helpless only a few years ago are now calling most of the
shots."); Michael St. James, Why Bad Things Happen in Large Chapter 11
Cases: Some Thoughts About Courting Failure, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus.
L. 169, 192 (2005) ("[M]ost large Chapter 11 cases will be forum-shopped to
courts that do not apply mainstream bankruptcy law.").
514 [Vol. 54
WHERE DO YOU GET OFF?
"consensus" among the major players in the case, (4)
approval of prepacks within about 30 days of filing, (5)
approval of critical vendor orders, (6) greater tolerance for
conflicts of interest, (7) deference to debtors on retention
bonuses and other executive pay issues, (8) maximum
tolerance of third party releases, (9) approval of section 363
sales of entire companies, and (10) minimization of estate
transfer taxes. Delaware led the way in the adoption of
these new rules and practices; other courts copied. For the
most part, these dramatic changes occurred only in"complex" cases that have been the subject of competition.
The judges who made these changes generally insist
that their purpose was to improve the bankruptcy process,
not to attract cases. The timing, however, warrants
suspicion. The effort to "improve" came only after the
Delaware court captured an 87% market share in 1996, and
the lawyers whose livelihoods were threatened had come
knocking on the judges' doors. The discussion accompanying
the effort was not a discussion of improvement. It was a
discussion of case-loss. In Chicago, for example, the focus
group appointed by the chief judge of the bankruptcy court
reported on "the perceived loss of potential Chicago Chapter
11 cases to Delaware."8 Even some of the staunchest
defenders of the courts admit that the courts have been
competing to attract cases. 9
8. REPORT ON FINDINGS OF CHICAGO BANKRUPTCY Focus GROUP REGARDING
PERCEIVED Loss OF POTENTIAL CHICAGO CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 CASES TO
DELAWARE (Chicago Bar Ass'n Bankruptcy & Reorganization Committee ed.,
2000) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). The four-page, unsigned, undated
report was produced by the Executive Office of the United States Trustee in
response to a Freedom of Information Act request by Lynn M. LoPucki.
9. Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 06-07, 2005) (manuscript on file with the Buffalo Law
Review) ("In short, there seems to be agreement on all sides of the debate that
there is some level of competition for large Chapter 11 cases."); Charles J. Tabb,
Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 467, 484 (2006) ("I believe that there
was indeed some 'competition' going on, as LoPucki asserts, but would suggest
that it was not as uniform or as monodimensional as he suggests."); Robert K.
Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects
of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 291




C. Step 3: Some of Those Changes Were Harmful and Made
in Bad Faith
The changes courts made to attract big cases were
harmful in two respects. First, many of them simply flouted
the law. For example, New York sought to match Delaware
by offering to confirm prepackaged cases in thirty days, but
could not assure that it could hold the meeting of creditors
required by Bankruptcy Code §341 before the confirmation
hearing. New York solved the problem by adopting a local
rule that excused holding the §341-mandated meeting. 10 To
confirm prepacks in thirty days also required that the
courts ignore the §1102(a) requirement that "the United
States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims." Committees could not form and
be effective in thirty days, so the United States trustees
stopped appointing them and the competing courts looked
the other way. Bankruptcy Code §1104(a)(1) says that "the
court shall order the appointment of a trustee... for cause,
including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management, either before or after the commencement of
the case . .. ."1 Despite that clear command, the New York
bankruptcy court left Ken Lay as CEO and Chairman of the
Board of Enron until he could participate in the
appointment of his successor.' 2
The second harm is that court competition has
apparently destroyed companies that otherwise would have
reorganized successfully. The proof is simple. During the
period of 1990 through 1996, Delaware completely
dominated the competition for cases. The companies that
reorganized in Delaware during that period refailed at rates
two to seven times higher than companies reorganized in
Other Courts during the same period. Doherty and I found
no difference in the companies choosing Delaware that
could explain their higher refailure rate13 and, although our
10. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York,
General Order 201, VIII.B., Feb. 2, 1999.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
12. LoPuCKi, supra note 2, at 14.
13. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New
York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1946-57
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data have been posted online for more than three years and
downloaded more than 100 times, neither has anyone else.
The logical conclusion to draw is that some aspect of the
Delaware process caused the refailures. If the companies
had filed elsewhere, they would not have failed a second
time.
Some commentators concede Delaware's dismal
performance during its period of ascendency, but
nevertheless maintain that the judges who copied Delaware
acted in good faith. 14 Once the Delaware court succeeded in
attracting cases, lawyers heaped praise on it. Judges
elsewhere thought, as Professor Tabb puts it, "that
Delaware had come up with, in effect, 'a better way of
building a mousetrap."' 15 I readily concede that many of the
judges had that belief with respect to many of the decisions
I criticize, and so acted in good faith in adopting Delaware
rules and practices. But those commentators' assertion that
all of the judges acted in good faith with respect to all of the
issues is implausible.
For the past year, I have been showing bankruptcy
professional audiences the list of trends in big-case
reorganization practice set forth in Step 2, and pointing out
that all of them are trends in favor of the interests of the
case placers. I then challenge those in the audience to name
one trend in big-case reorganization practice that has been
moving against the case placers. Of course, no one can. As
long as the competition continues, such a trend on any issue
of importance to the case placers is impossible.
D. Step 4: "Corruption" is the Right Word
Because I have no way of knowing whether any
particular judge made any particular ruling in bad faith,
Courting Failure makes no charge of corruption against any
particular judge or court. But were it possible to know that
a particular judge made a particular ruling with the motive
of attracting future cases, and that the judge would have
(2002) (reporting on multiple regressions run in an unsuccessful attempt to
identify causes of failure exogenous to Delaware).
14. E.g., St. James, supra note 7, at 176 ("[Wlell-intentioned, principled
judges can make all of the decisions LoPucki identifies as 'corrupt."') (emphasis
in original).
15. Tabb, supra note 9, at 484.
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ruled differently in the absence of that motive, "corruption"
does not seem to me to be too strong a word. Because they
take from one constituency and give to another for the
benefit of the judge or the judge's supporters, such rulings
are, in my opinion, "rotten or morally depraved."
16
The conclusion that competition is corrupting the
bankruptcy courts is, for most readers, an unpleasant one.
Yet, if the reader cannot reject at least one of the four steps
of my argument, that conclusion is logically compelled. So,
if you want to continue to maintain that competition for big
cases is not corrupting the bankruptcy courts, where do you
get off?
II. RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CRITICS
To the extent that the papers for this symposium
converge in their criticism, that criticism is directed against
my use of the word "corruption." Professor Dickerson,
Professor Tabb, and Judge Martin have all focused their
papers on this complaint.
A. Judge Robert D. Martin
Judge Martin has been a personal friend of mine for
many years and I have the highest respect for his
understanding of the bankruptcy system. In his brief
Comments, he makes essentially two points. The first is
that the character of the approximately four hundred
United States bankruptcy judges is sufficiently high that
their incentives to compete for cases are insufficient to sway
their decisions. I doubt, however, that he means to say that
is true of every single one of them. Rather, I think he is
expressing the valid concern that an accusation of
corruption against the bankruptcy courts that is not
coupled with the ability to say precisely which judge is
corrupt ends up harming the innocent as well as the guilty.
Martin expressed essentially the same fear in 1997 when
the controversy over the Delaware bankruptcy court first
erupted: "The reaction I'm hearing from judges is that it's
very frightening that a bankruptcy court may be cast in a
16. Dickerson, supra note 7, at 366.
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bad light and that light will then be reflected on all other
bankruptcy courts."'
17
That Martin and others could predict the effect of the
controversy over the Delaware bankruptcy court eight years
before the publication of Courting Failure demonstrates
that I am not the problem, but merely the messenger. Put
courts in competition for big cases and you should expect
exactly what is now happening.
The legal system offers two simple solutions for the
problem. Unsurprisingly, neither is to kill the messenger or
to shut up the critics. The first is for the judge to "avoid...
the appearance of impropriety."' 8 The second is for the
judge to "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'19
The impartiality of the competing bankruptcy courts
has reasonably been questioned. Were the competing judges
really indifferent to whether they presided over the largest
and most important cases or the Chapter 13 docket, they
could easily allay suspicions of them-and make a fool of
me-by disqualifying themselves from, or transferring, a
few of the biggest and most important cases to other courts.
Of course, that is not going to happen-too much is at
stake.
Martin agrees with me that "decisions have been made
which are not well founded in law and which are beneficial
to . . . case placers," that the judges have been subjected to
"an enormous onslaught" by demanding lawyers and DIP
lenders, and that "the bankruptcy law now practiced in
large Chapter 11 cases bears little relationship to the
statutory text."20 These remarks show that his opinion of
what is going on the courts is not so different from mine.
His complaint is that I "place all the blame for the
corrupting decisions on the bankruptcy judges."'21 This is,
however, a misreading of Courting Failure. What I actually
say about the judges is pretty much the same thing he says:
17. What Delaware's Withdrawal of the Reference Means, CONSUMER BANKR.
NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997.
18. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
20. Hon. Robert D. Martin, Comments, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2006).
21. Id. at 504.
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that they are victims of a defective system, put by that
system into a no-win situation:
The bankruptcy judges are more visible yet perhaps less
sympathetic victims of the competition. Over the past fifteen
years, hundreds of them have had to decide whether to compete for
the big cases .... The case placers want good judges, but they
want more than that. Like most litigants, they want to win
without regard to whether they are right.
Bankruptcy judges are generally good people of high integrity.
Probably few enter the competition with the idea that they will
trade their integrity for cases....
Refusing to participate in the competition is no solution. Judges
who refuse to cooperate offend their local communities and bring
their own competence into question. Many end up isolated,
irrelevant, and toxic. At least two judges have lost their jobs for
refusing to meet the demands of the competition. For the judges,
the bankruptcy court competition is a no-win situation. 22
I am not attacking the judges. I am attacking the venue
rules that put them in competition.
B. Professor Charles J. Tabb
Charles Tabb's Courting Controversy is perhaps the
most eloquent, entertaining, and downright funny
bankruptcy essay ever written. At several points in my
reading of it, I laughed out loud. But to borrow one of
Tabb's expressions, I would have enjoyed it a lot more if he
had not been picking on me.
In Courting Controversy, Tabb repeats almost every
nasty, ungracious thing said about me since the publication
of Courting Failure. As I reeled from this character
assassination-I find it difficult to call it anything else-he
accused me of "character assassination" and claimed that
he found it "difficult to call it anything else. ' 23 He followed
up with a couple of pages in which he encourages judges
profiled in Courting Failure to sue me for defamation and
stops just short of opining that they would win. 24 All of this
was merely a prelude to Tabb's analysis of why I wrote
what I did-an exercise that begins with the presumption
22. LoPucKi, supra note 2, at 257-58.
23. Tabb, supra note 9, at 475.
24. Id. at 476-77.
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that I did not simply write it merely because I believed it to
be true.
I nevertheless count Courting Controversy as a positive
review. With only a few exceptions, Tabb accurately
describes the arguments I make in Courting Failure and, in
the end, agrees with all of its important conclusions. The
bankruptcy courts are competing for big cases 25 and the
competition is corrupting them.26 Our differences are
differences in emphasis and degree.
For his accusation of "character assassination," Tabb
gives only two examples. The first, dealing with Judge
Arthur Gonzalez's failure to appoint a trustee in Enron, he
compiles by removing several phrases from their context
and juxtaposing them. Here is the context, with the phrases
Tabb chose to include in italics:
This competition among the bankruptcy courts for big cases put
Kenneth Lay, the founder and chairman of the board of the Enron
Corporation, in the catbird seat. Lay would have his choice of
courts for the Enron bankruptcy. If he chose wisely, the grateful
court would protect him from cresting public outrage and, by so
doing, make itself attractive to the corrupt or incompetent
executives of future bankrupt firms.
27
Four pages later:
New York bankruptcy judge Arthur J. Gonzalez drew the Enron
case. From Ken Lay's perspective, Gonzalez performed splendidly.
The creditors moved to transfer the case to Houston. Judge
Gonzalez denied the motion. Several major creditors requested the
appointment of a trustee. Gonzalez delayed a hearing until he
brokered a deal that left most of Enron's management in place.
During the delay, Ken Lay was able to choose Stephen Cooper as
Enron's new CEO. Because Cooper was a respected turnaround
manager, the prospects for the appointment of a trustee dimmed.
The creditors soon gave up the fight. That meant that directors
chosen by Ken Lay and in office long before the scandal broke
25. See id. at 484 ("I believe that there was indeed some 'competition' going
on, as LoPucki asserts, but would suggest that it was not as uniform or as
monodimensional as he suggests.").
26. See id. at 486 ("Perhaps in some sense there is a tinge of 'corruption', as
LoPucki defines it, but I do not think it is nearly as universal or powerful as he
describes.").
27. LoPuCKI, supra note 2, at 10. Italicized text appears in Tabb, supra note
9, at 474.
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remained in control of the company through the crucial stages of
the bankruptcy case. They resigned only after they too had chosen
their own successors.
As a result, the investigators remained on the outside for the
duration of the Enron case. For a management engaged in massive
fraud, it was the best bankruptcy result for which one could hope.
The government took almost three years putting together a case
sufficient to indict Lay. Lay has still not been sued for his
mismanagement of Enron, and it seems likely he never will be.
The New York bankruptcy court had proven itself a trustworthy
protector of managements accused of fraud.
The market reacted swiftly. By mid-2002 managements accused
of fraud delivered three more corporate giants [Global Crossing,
Adelphia Communications, and Worldcom] . . . to the New York
bankruptcy court.
28
Webster's College Dictionary defines "character
assassination" as "a slandering attack, especially intended
to damage the reputation of a public or political figure.
'29
But Tabb offers neither any evidence of slander-at
minimum a false statement of some kind about Judge
Gonzalez-nor any evidence of intent to damage Gonzalez's
reputation. Instead, Tabb does exactly what he criticizes me
for doing-he presumes to know why I did what I did.
30
What I have done in this passage is to report the decisions
Judge Gonzalez made and their effect on the flow of cases.
Nor was I the only one to take offense at Gonzalez's
decision. Long before I complained, Professor Kenneth Klee
said "[i]f ever a case screamed out for [the appointment of] a
trustee, this is it. '31 Klee also "said he was surprised that
Judge Arthur J. Gonzalez, himself a former U.S. trustee,
would not move on his own and appoint a trustee.
'32
Professor Linda Ekstrom Stanley said she "was amazed
when Enron filed . . . why a trustee was not appointed
immediately. ' 33 Prominent practitioner Ron Trost astutely
28. LoPucKI, supra note 2, at 14.
29. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 223 (2d ed. 2000).
30. See Tabb, supra note 9, at 474. ("As to the italicized first clause-how
could LoPucki know why Judge Sonderby did what she did?").
31. No Rush To Appoint Trustee For Enron, BCD NEWS AND COMMENT, Feb.
27, 2002, at 6.
32. Id.
33. Pamela A. MacLean, Forum Shopping Alleged in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Cases, DEL. L. WKLY., May 11, 2005, at 6.
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asked, "If you don't have a Chapter 11 trustee in this case,
when would you have it?"
34
The Courting Failure passages Tabb cites say nothing
about Gonzalez's motives. Tabb claims to find a statement
of motive in the sentence "[t]he New York bankruptcy court
had proven itself a trustworthy protector of managements
accused of fraud."35 That statement, however, describes the
effect of Gonzalez's decision, not his motives for making it.
In the midst of his "character assassination" charge,
Tabb demonstrates two crucial misunderstandings of the
Enron's facts that may explain his intemperance. First,
Tabb states that "[t]he old management had already been
replaced at the time of bankruptcy. '36 In fact, Ken Lay
remained as CEO and Chairman of the Board for about
sixty days into the case, resigning only when his successor
had been chosen. 37 The board members Lay selected before
the scandal broke remained in the majority until about six
months into the case.38 Second, Tabb conflates the civil and
criminal charges against Lay 39 in a manner that causes him
to miss the fact that if Lay is not criminally convicted, he
will remain a millionaire. 40 In Courting Failure, I charge
that Gonzalez's failure to appoint a trustee resulted in an
34. Bankruptcy After Enron - Part 2, BCD NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 7, 2002,
at 3.
35. LOPUCKI, supra note 2, at 14.
36. Tabb, supra note 9, at 475.
37. See LOPUCKI, supra note 2, at 146-47 (describing the events surrounding
Lay's resignation).
38. See id.
39. Tabb complains that "[tihe claim that Lay will never be held accountable
for his mismanagement appears inaccurate." Tabb, supra note 9, at 476. What I
said was, "[t]he government took almost three years putting together a case
sufficient to indict Lay. Lay has still not been sued for his mismanagement of
Enron, and it seems likely he never will be." LOPUCKI, supra note 2, at 14. He
hasn't been sued to this day and the statute of limitations has probably run.
40. See Alexei Barrionuevo & Kurt Eichenwald, For Ken Lay, Enron's Riches
Turning to Ruin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at Al (noting that "[Lay] and his
wife Linda still occupy the same apartment in an expensive condominium
building in the wealthy River Oaks section of Houston. The apartment,
however, cannot be sold because it is subject to forfeiture in the criminal case.");
Ronald E. Cohen, Enron Executives Invoke 'The Dog Ate My Homework' Excuses,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 2002 (explaining that this apartment was
valued at $8 million in 2002).
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unwieldy administration of the case. The unwieldy
administration led to a scramble to file necessary litigation
before the statute of limitations ran, resulted in the failure
of anyone to bring a mismanagement action against Lay on
behalf of the Enron estate, and also led to the probably
inadvertent omission of a key theory from the fraudulent
transfer action that the estate did file against Lay.41 Had
the facts been as Tabb reports them, my complaints about
Gonzalez's failure to appoint a trustee might have
warranted his reaction. But they were not.
The second example on which Tabb bases his allegation
of "character assassination" is a single sentence from
Courting Failure: "Determined to remain in the competition
for cases, Judge Sonderby refused to order the recipients of
[the $200 million to $300 million in] critical vendor
payments to return the money pending the outcome of the
appeal."42 Tabb charges that the clause that begins this
sentence imputes an improper motive to Judge Sonderby
without an adequate basis for knowing that was in fact her
intention.43 Tabb is correct, and I apologize to Judge
Sonderby for the sentence. When Tabb called this error to
my attention, I immediately requested that the University
of Michigan Press correct the sentence in future editions.
The Press made the correction in the paperback edition of
Courting Failure published in February 2006.
Immediately following his discussion of the Sonderby
sentence, Tabb charges that "LoPucki's book is replete with
examples of this approach."44 (Tabb defines the approach as
"unequivocal and pious condemnation of judges' and others'
motivations-which he states as unquestioned facts."4 5). I
scanned the book for other places where I might have
similarly imputed a motive for a particular decision without
a factual basis for doing so. I found none, and so advised
Tabb. I am now hoping that Tabb will send me an apology
as well.
41. See LoPUCKI, supra note 2, at 147-51 (describing the problems that
resulted from Gonzalez's failure to appoint a trustee).
42. Id. at 166.
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C. Professor A. Mechele Dickerson
Mechele Dickerson wastes no time on the usual
pleasantries before getting right to her main point: my use
of the word "corruption" made it "virtually impossible to
rationally discuss the topic."
46
"Corruption" is a powerful word. Which may explain why the
typical reaction to Courting Failure begins, and often ends, with a
passionate discussion of whether bankruptcy judges are corrupt....
That the discourse over bankruptcy venue for large corporations
has been so personal is unfortunate, because-in this
atmosphere-it is virtually impossible to rationally discuss the
topic. 47
There certainly have been times (generally following a
publication by Tom Salerno) when I have been inclined to
agree with her. But this symposium-and a number of
separate essays about Courting Failure-are evidence to
the contrary. Academics are certainly engaged on the topic
of bankruptcy venue for large corporations. Indeed, in his
contribution to this symposium, Charles Tabb argues that
the issue has come to life only because of my use of the word
"corruption."48
The first and most immediate effect of his book, and one as to
which I would gauge him to have been a resounding success, is
that he has gotten people talking. . . . Venue choice, forum
shopping and court competition are all being discussed and
debated.... Much of the discussion has been couched as an attack
back against LoPucki, but if he has a thick enough skin and can
take it, at least he has gotten the issue out into the spotlight.
49
I do not pretend that this discussion has been pleasant
for the participants. But I do not see how a discussion of
corruption can go forward if one is not permitted to say that
corruption exists.
Dickerson would change my definition of "corrupt" to
make it more palatable. During the period in which I was
writing Courting Failure, I considered doing precisely that.
46. Dickerson, supra note 7, at 365.
47. Id.
48. See Tabb, supra note 9, at 486.
49. Id.
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Ultimately, I decided that (1) another definition would not
make the word more palatable, and (2) for me to understate
my conclusions as to what was occurring in the bankruptcy
courts would in the long run be confusing-particularly if I
end up in disagreement with others who spoke the
unvarnished truth.
Dickerson also complains that Courting Failure does
not "[t]ell[] a [c]oherent [s]tory" 50 because it fails to explain
why judges sometimes made decisions not apparently
calculated to attract cases:
LoPucki bolsters his principal contention that the bankruptcy
courts are engaging in competitive behavior by attempting to
make every court decision or action fit neatly into the competition
story. In so doing, he either ignores or downplays actions that
courts or case placers made if those actions were inconsistent with
the competitive theory. For example, LoPucki never explains why
the Houston judge would not have "fought" to keep the
Continental case, if courts so desperately want big cases Nor does
he explain why the New York judge would have made such a "bad"
ruling in the LTV case, since one would assume the judge knew
that such a ruling would displease the case placers. Similarly,
LoPucki states that the judge in the Kmart case was too
embarrassed to rule that certain managers could keep certain
bonuses, which makes little sense if competing judges will really
do anything to keep the case placers happy.
51
Others have made essentially the same point. Some use
the example of Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Mary F.
Walrath's opinion in Fleming Companies criticizing
Kirkland & Ellis, LLP (a case placer by any measure) and
cutting its fees. 52 Others cite the decision by Judge Robert
50. Dickerson, supra note 7, at 373.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See In re Fleming Co., 304 B.R. 85 (Bankr. Del. 2003). In that opinion,
Judge Walrath's frustration is evident:
The overall conduct of this case has been contentious, disorganized and
wasteful of the time and efforts of both this Court and other counsel
involved in the case. The warnings of the Court have gone unheeded by
counsel for the Debtors as the same "mistakes" continue to be made
time and again.
Id. at 94.
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Drain of the New York bankruptcy court transferring the
Winn-Dixie case to Florida.
53
None of these decisions are necessarily inconsistent
with the thesis I present in Courting Failure: many courts
and judges are competing for big cases. The probable
explanation for the Houston judge's failure to fight for the
Continental case is simply that he didn't want it. Not all of
the judges are competing for cases. 54 The judge in Kmart
did not sign the order, but she did allow the managers to
keep the bonuses-an outcome probably at least equally
appealing to future case placers. 55 A judge whose sole
consideration was the size and number of cases she could
attract would not have written the opinion Judge Walrath
wrote. But I have never argued that attracting cases is the
sole motivation of any judge. Judge Walrath may have been
more concerned with what she saw as overreaching by
Kirkland & Ellis than with the effect on the attractiveness
of the Delaware court. The Delaware court may have paid a
steep price for her decision. 56 Judge Drain may have been
more concerned with the storm of bad publicity that
preceded, and certainly would have continued following, a
decision retaining Winn-Dixie. 57 Nor is it clear that a
decision by the New York court holding Winn-Dixie there
against its will would have attracted other Winn-Dixies to
New York.
53. Amended Order Transferring Venue of the Debtor's Bankruptcy Cases to
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida,
Jacksonville Division, Docket #739 dated Apr. 14, 2005 and filed in In re Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., case # 05-11063. The transcript of the bench ruling referred
to in that decision is on file with the Buffalo Law Review.
54. See LOPUCKI, supra note 2, at 20 ("Not all judges do want the cases.").
55. See id. at 154.
56. In 2003 and several prior years, Delaware's market share of large public
company bankruptcies exceeded 30%. Walrath handed down her opinion in
December 2003. In 2004, Delaware's market share dipped to 13/--Delaware's
worst year since 1991. In 2005, Delaware's market share rebounded to 25%. See
LoPucki, supra note 5.
57. See, e.g., Michael L. Cook & Jessica L. Fainman, No Time for
Bankruptcy Venue Hypocrisy, THE BANKR. STRATEGIST, June 2005, available at
LEXIS, Library NWS, Filename ALLNWS (referring to "[t]he recent Winn Dixie




The existence of such counter-examples does not render
my thesis non-falsifiable. Researchers could still falsify it by
showing that (1) bankruptcy courts commonly make
decisions that result in the loss of big cases, (2) the courts
that attract cases are no more likely to rule for the case
placers than to rule against them, or (3) that "competing"
courts make decisions adverse to the case placers without
salient conflicting motives. If, for example, a trend were to
develop of appointing trustees in the largest of Chapter 11
cases, I would cheerfully admit error, retract my thesis, and
apologize to everyone.
D. Professor Melissa B. Jacoby
One of the theses of Courting Failure is that court
competition causes high reorganization failure rates. In
Fast, Cheap, and Creditor Controlled,58 Melissa Jacoby asks
the two questions about this thesis that I find most difficult
to answer. As a prelude to the first of these questions, she
recounts the data: refiling rates for companies reorganized
in Other Courts jumped abruptly from 6% in the period
1991-96 to 46% in the period 1997-2000. 59 She then notes
the four events that I argue triggered competition by other
courts and explain the jump occurred in 1996 and the first
month of 1997.60 How, she asks, could those four events
have produced their effect so quickly? (Two of the six
failures that make up the 46% failure rate were failures of
companies emerging in 1997.61)
Several answers suggest themselves. Three of the four
1997 Other Court confirmations took place in the last
quarter of that year-late enough for the cases to have been
influenced by events that took place at the beginning of that
year. Although the formal changes adopted by courts in
response to Delaware were implemented in the period 1998-
2002, informal changes actually causing the increase in
failure rates may have been implemented sooner. All that
necessarily had to happen was for a few judges to change
58. Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate
Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401 (2006).
59. Id. at 412.
60. Id. at 414.
61. LoPucki, supra note 5.
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their attitudes toward the competition and communicate
that to a few key members of the local bar. In such a small
legal community, word could travel very quickly.
The second question is how competition causes
reorganization failure. Jacoby correctly points out that, of
the undesirable practices resulting from court competition,
only a single one-failure of courts to adequately review
feasibility-seems even plausibly capable of dooming a
reorganization. Joseph Doherty and I explained the
mechanism by which that failure might have caused high
failure rates in Delaware and New York without causing
high failure rates in Other Courts:
The Bankruptcy Code requires that the courts make findings
that plans are feasible before confirming them. In response,
virtually all courts require expert testimony of plan feasibility.
Plan proponents are usually under great pressure to succeed at
the confirmation hearing. As a result, they may take the issue of
feasibility more seriously in courts they know to be more
demanding--or, perhaps more to the point, in courts about which
they know nothing-than in the high-volume, pro-confirmation,
laissez-faire courts of Delaware and New York. Other Courts'
reorganization processes may require greater feasibility than
Delaware's, even if Other Courts' judges do not.
62
Debtors continued to choose the courts least likely to
reorganize them successfully because the choice of court
was made by case placers for whom the interests of the
debtors were not paramount:
We speculate that at the core of this market failure is the
parties' desire to appear to reorganize without in fact doing so.
Effective reorganization is unpleasant. Managers must at least
acknowledge their past failures and perhaps also resign their
positions. Creditors must accept substantial reductions in the
amounts owed to them. The interests of shareholders must be
finally and permanently extinguished. All parties hope to benefit
from the bankruptcy court's certification that the firm has faced
up to its problems and resolved them, but no party wants the firm
to actually face up to its problems.
63
As to the theory that courts' failure to adequately
review feasibility explains the pattern of refiling, Jacoby
62. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 13, at 1984 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 1985.
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notes that I did not push it in Courting Failure. Little
evidence exists that the Other Courts reviewed feasibility
in the period 1991 through 1996. Jacoby concludes that "the
mechanism by which judicial competition might manifest
itself in terms of repeat filings remains very much a
mystery. '6 4 Jacoby is right in thinking that the mechanism
by which court competition causes reorganization failure
remains something of a mystery. But despite our inability
to specify the mechanism by which it operates, court
competition remains the only explanation of the refiling
pattern that comes even close to explaining both the
difference in failure rates between Delaware and Other
Courts from 1991-96 and the increase in Other Court
refiling rates from 1997-2000. Both the difference and the
increase are highly statistically significant. 65 There is less
than one chance in a thousand that the difference was
generated randomly and about three chances in a thousand
that the increase was generated randomly. The simplest
explanation is that some condition in the Other Courts was
different from Delaware in the period from 1991 through
1996 and then became the same in 1997. Court competition
is the only condition that fits the bill.
In a separate, but perhaps equally important
contribution, Jacoby characterizes the change in
reorganization practice since the 1980s as the judges
increasingly taking a "transactional" view of big-case
reorganization.
For those who embrace the transactional model, courts who
limit their involvement to overseeing sales and approving parties'
pre-arranged deals are fulfilling their objectives. Judges labeled as
"competent" and "sophisticated" in this model are those who make
themselves accessible for quick decision-making and approval of
consensual deals but otherwise leave the parties alone to do their
business in the largest cases. This is to be contrasted with the
more managerial role many judges have adopted with respect to
very small business cases.66
Jacoby offers this transactional view as "normative
and/or positive" in the minds of the judges, a "policy
64. Jacoby, supra note 58, at 422.
65. For the difference, p < .001. For the increase, p = .003.
66. Jacoby, supra note 58, at 432-33.
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preference" that motivates their decisions. I agree with
Jacoby that this view predominates.
Jacoby correctly places this change as having occurred
in "the late 1990s,"67 but does not inquire into its cause. I
submit that it was for some judges an ideological
commitment to "private ordering" and for others merely a
rationalization for doing what was necessary to compete for
big cases. Across a wide range of issues, giving the case
placers what they want and acceding to private ordering
are the same thing.68
Jacoby gives no clue as to what might have caused this
change to the transactional view. Nor does she say whether
she considers the change normatively desirable. She does,
however, attempt to excuse the development as intended by
Congress: "In enacting Chapter 11 in 1978, Congress
limited judges' active oversight of cases and thus set
Chapter 11 down the path to an even less judicially-
oriented process. This likely contributed to the development
of court practices that LoPucki characterizes as . . . lenient
with case placers. ' 69 In support of that view, she resurrects
a comment by Whitford and me in which we reported
"judicial restraint" as a "norm in large reorganization cases"
and an "understanding" that "the appropriate judicial role
involves deciding issues brought before the court by parties
in interest."70
What Jacoby misses is that our report was on an
empirical study of cases filed and concluded by April 1986.
That year, Congress amended Bankruptcy Code §105 to
give bankruptcy judges the authority to raise issues sua
sponte-even when other provisions of the Code required
67. Id. at 430.
68. Either can explain the payment of professional fees at above-market
rates, the confirmation of unfeasible reorganization plans, and the approval of
just about anything if nobody objects. But only giving the case placers what
they want can explain the lenience of the bankruptcy courts in allowing the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements, the termination of pension plans,
and approval of the many transactions that go forward over the objection of
creditors' committees.
69. Jacoby, supra note 58, at 428.
70. Id. at 430; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993).
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that they be raised by parties in interest. 71 Specifically, the
amendment added this sentence:
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a
party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua
sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary
or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
72
The core concept of the transactional view is that unless
some party objects, the courts should allow those with their
money at stake to determine how the case proceeds. The
1986 amendment is flatly contrary to the transactional
view.
That the transactional view prevailed in spite of the
Congressional command is what Professor George Kuney
refers to as the "hijacking of Chapter 11."'73 But even Kuney
cannot explain what changed to make it possible for
lawyers to force such a sudden change in philosophy on the
courts so shortly after Congress rejected it. Here as well,
the only plausible explanation is court competition. Once
courts are in competition, the power lies with the case
placers. Case placers deliver cases to the courts willing to
stretch furthest in the case placers' desired direction. For
the case placers to do anything else would, as numerous
commentators have pointed out, be malpractice. 74
Jacoby and other commentators see no way to
distinguish a good faith surrender to the demands of the
case placers pursuant to the transactional view from a bad
faith surrender to the demands of the cases placers
pursuant to court competition. 75 Nevertheless, the fact that
so many judges converted to a view that provides so
71. See In re Rubenstein, 71 B.R. 777 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the sentence added to Bankruptcy Code §105(a) did not merely restate former
law, but reversed it).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
73. See Kuney, supra note 7.
74. Dickerson, supra note 7, at 371.
75. See, e.g., St. James, supra note 7, at 176 ("Importantly, while the
decisions [on critical vendor orders, professional fees and other issues]
represent minority viewpoints, well intentioned, principled judges can make all
of the decisions LoPucki identifies as 'corrupt."').
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convenient an excuse for doing what judges must to attract
cases makes those conversions suspect.
Despite considerable overlap, the transactional view
and the interests of the case placers are not the same. As
creditors' committees and other significant non-case placer
constituencies object to case placer demands, the competing
courts will be forced to choose the case placers' side.
Ultimately, those choices will reveal unmistakably the true
state of affairs in the United States bankruptcy courts.
E. Professors Douglas G. Baird and Robert K Rasmussen
Over the past two decades, Douglas Baird and Bob
Rasmussen have been asking the big questions about
bankruptcy reorganization. No one has had greater
influence over the thinking of bankruptcy scholars.
Although we often differ in both our premises and our
conclusions, I have tremendous respect for their analytical
abilities and academic integrity, and am honored by their
participation in this symposium.
Although I agree with much of what they say in Beyond
Recidivism, 76 I focus here on four points of difference: (1)
whether the evidence warrants the conclusion that court
competition caused Delaware's high recidivism rates, (2)
whether the evidence warrants the conclusion that the
Delaware process caused those failures, (3) the reasons for
Chapter 1l 's existence, and (4) whether today's bankrupt
firms lack going concern value.
1. Do the data show competition to be the cause of
Delaware recidivism? Baird and Rasmussen accept that the
Delaware bankruptcy court's rates of recidivism were
statistically significantly higher than Other Courts' rates
during Delaware's period of ascendency. They also appear
to accept that the Delaware court was competing for cases
during that period. 77 They, nevertheless, contend that the
76. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism, 54 BUFF.
L. REV. 343 (2006).
77. Id. at 344 ("Bankruptcy judges elsewhere took note and mimicked them
in an effort to attract large cases to their own courts.").
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data fall short of proving that the competitive efforts caused
the failures.
78
The argument by which Baird and Rasmussen would
exonerate Delaware begins with their assertion that the
courts did not compete for prepackaged cases. 79 Thus, they
continue, in studying the effects of competition,
prepackaged cases should be omitted.8 0 After omitting the
prepackaged cases, too few cases remain to draw any
conclusions at all.
8 1
This argument suffers from three problems. First,
Delaware did compete for prepacks. Second, Delaware's
non-prepacks failed at rates about the same as its prepacks.
Third, even ignoring the prepacks, Delaware's refailure rate
remains significantly elevated.
Speed was an integral part of what Delaware was
selling, and the prepackaged cases were the ultimate in
speed.8 2 In his report to the Judicial Conference Committee
in early 1997, Gordon Bermant described Delaware's
attraction:
Delaware's magnetism is of a different sort. While S.D.N.Y.
cases took longer to confirm than the national average, Delaware's
cases were confirmed much more rapidly. As noted above, the
speed is closely connected to the fact that the Delaware cases were
predominantly prepackaged or prenegotiated filings. It is plausible
and certainly consistent with the findings, that one of Delaware's
attractions is the availability of smooth prepackaged filing and
case management processes-characteristics which include rapid
transit through Chapter 11. 3
78. Id. at 350 ("Destructive competition is one hypothesis, but many other
forces were at work that might have produced these results.").
79. Id. at 348 ("Judges do not compete to become rubber stamps.").
80. Id. at 349 ("Prepackaged plans have a dynamic that is different from
other cases. Hence, combining prepacks with other types of cases in Delaware is
suspect.").
81. Id. at 355 ("Three data points are not enough.").
82. See LoPucKi, supra note 2, at 162 (describing court rules adopted in
New York and Los Angeles specifically to compete for prepackaged cases).
83. GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE
BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 39 (1997).
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Similarly, in a 1998 article, David Skeel described
Delaware's "speciality" as "prepacks and speed."84
Had Delaware's failures been heavily concentrated in
its prepackaged cases, that might have justified the
separation of cases for which Baird and Rasmussen
contend. A good Delaware performance in non-
prenegotiated, non-prepackaged cases should not be
disparaged by lumping it together with Delaware's poor
performance in prepackaged cases. But Delaware didn't
have a good performance record for any kind of case. The
refiling rate for Delaware's non-prepackaged, non-
prenegotiated cases was almost identical to Delaware's
overall refiling rate.
Table 1. Delaware Refiling by Prepackaged Status, 1991-1996
Cases
Cases Refilings Refiling rate
Prepackaged 14 7 50%
Prenegotiated 5 1 20%
Non-prepackaged, 7 3 43%
non-prenegotiated
Total 26 11 42%
Source: Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database.
The similarity in refiling rates for all three categories of
cases suggests that all three kinds of cases together reflect
whatever caused Delaware's high refiling rates.
Finally, even if we make the separation for which Baird
and Rasmussen contend-ignoring the prepackaged and
84. David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998). Skeel continued, "[a]n
obvious explanation for Delaware's striking specialization is that Delaware is
only one of several venue options, and managers have strong practical reasons
to file where their offices are located." Id.
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prenegotiated cases-Delaware's refiling rate is still more
than six times as high as the Other Court refiling rate. The
difference in those rates is borderline statistically
significant.85




Delaware 7 3 43%
Other 41 3 7%
Courts
Total 48 6 p =.055
p = .055
Source: Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database.
2. Do the data show that the Delaware process caused
those failures? Baird and Rasmussen accept that Delaware-
reorganized companies failed at rates much higher than
Other Court-reorganized companies in the five years after
confirmation. They argue, however, that the mere fact of
the failures is not enough to show that the failures result
from any deficiency in the Delaware process. Drawing an
analogy to a hypothetical study in which a researcher
considers whether watching football on television causes
early death,8 6 they make the point that some difference in
the companies choosing Delaware rather than some aspect
of the Delaware process may be driving the results-what
statisticians call a "selection effect." Researchers can
overcome a selection effect in two ways. The first is to
randomly assign subjects to the groups to be compared. We
85. p = .055, Fisher's exact, two-tailed. This is only slightly higher than the
traditional cutoff of .05.
86. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 353-54.
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obviously cannot do that here. The other is to statistically
control for all relevant differences between the subjects
placing themselves in the two groups. Doherty and I
attempted to do that by testing for more than a dozen
possible differences in the companies choosing Delaware
that might have accounted for Delaware's higher refiling
rates. We found none that could.8 7
Baird and Rasmussen do not object to the manner in
which we did that. Nor do they propose any additional
variables for study. Their objection is based solely on their
assertion that the prepackaged cases shouldn't count:
LoPucki cannot analogize his results to smoking and lung cancer
because he has not controlled for all the things that might have led
to higher rates of recidivism in Delaware (and later elsewhere)
other than judges aiming to make case placers happy. The same
factor (or combination of factors) that led the company to file in
Delaware might also have led them to fail again. LoPucki is
unable to eliminate such possibilities, not because he is unwilling,
but because he lacks the data. The handful of traditional
reorganizations in LoPucki's sample is simply insufficient to allow
us to identify competition among the courts as the cause of higher
rates of recidivism.
8 8
But for reasons already stated above, the prepackaged cases
should count, and, even without them, the number of cases
available for study is sufficient to reach borderline
statistical significance.
Baird and Rasmussen also argue that the failure and
refiling data "fall far short of what is needed to make the
use of the word 'corrupt' appropriate. '8 9 Let me make clear
that I do not assert that bankruptcy judges are corrupt
because their cases failed. I assert that some bankruptcy
judges are corrupt because-under pressure to compete for
cases-they, in bad faith, decided their large public
company cases in ways designed to bring them more
cases.90 The validity of that assertion in no way depends on
whether their decisions caused refilings.
87. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 13, at 1946-57 (reporting on the testing
of nineteen variables related to eleven factors).
88. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 354 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 353 n.27.
90. Supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
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3. Why bankruptcy reorganization? In the second part
of their paper, Baird and Rasmussen ask the biggest of
bankruptcy reorganization questions: "[W]hy we should
have a reorganization law at all."91 In two earlier papers,
they presented their own answer to that question: "Chapter
11 is a useful place to sell assets and implement
nonbankruptcy workouts. ' 92  The "non-bankruptcy
workouts" reference is apparently to the bankruptcy court's
newly assumed role of enforcing whatever draconian
contract a DIP lender can persuade a floundering debtor to
enter into in the period before bankruptcy. What Baird and
Rasmussen do not adequately consider is the possibility
that these contracts externalize costs to other creditors and
parties in interest and that bankruptcy courts approve
them only because the case placers who make the contracts
dominate the competing, and thus vulnerable, courts.
Baird and Rasmussen's question has no simple answer.
Court supervision of reorganization serves many purposes.
Certainly, one is to provide for the independent and
consistent adjudication of disputes among the parties to a
reorganization. Court competition is a direct threat to that
goal because it deprives the court of independence. 93 A
second purpose of court supervision is to prevent precisely
the phenomenon Baird and Rasmussen applaud: contracts
by which DIP lenders take control of distressed debtors and
manage those debtors for the DIP lenders' own advantage.
94
A third purpose of Chapter 11 is to prevent the
externalization of costs to those who have no formal
91. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 355.
92. Id. at 356.
93. See St. James, supra note 7, at 191
[The judicial view] most essential to the forum shoppers is... a court's
willingness to abdicate independent adjudication in favor of approving
whatever the parties agree upon. It is possible to 'work around'
everything else, but if the court exercises independence, it loses
'predictability' and will not be acceptable to the forum shoppers.
94. See Kuney, supra note 7, at 24-25. Kuney refers to
[A] number of phenomena and tactics that, taken together, especially
in large corporate cases, have been very effective at allowing secured
creditors capitalizing upon agency problems to gain the help of insiders
and insolvency professional to effectively take over--or hijack-the
chapter 11 process and essentially create a federal unified foreclosure
process.
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entitlements in the reorganization process: employees,
pensioners, customers, suppliers, communities, taxing
authorities, and others. I discuss this purpose at length
elsewhere.
95
A fourth purpose is to preserve going-concern value.96
In essence, that means preventing the uneconomic
destruction of the complex relationships that constitute the
firm. 97 Firms are often threatened with such destruction
because (1) in periods of financial distress events move too
quickly for the contracting process, and (2) parties to
negotiations are not always willing to agree to deals that
are in their own interests. Reorganization "crams down"
such deals by imposing them on recalcitrant parties, thus
solving both the liquidity and the holdout problems.
4. Do today's bankrupt firms lack going-concern value?
Baird and Rasmussen claim that the reorganization process
can't preserve going-concern value because bankrupt
companies "typically have little or no going concern
value. '98 They argue that "traditional reorganizations"-in
which the bankruptcy court becomes a forum for
negotiation or litigation-are at their "end" or at least in
their "twilight."99
Baird and Rasmussen recognize that going concern
value is found not in the assets of the firm, but in the
relationships-both internal and external-that constitute
the firm.100  Creating relationships is expensive, so
preserving them will often make economic sense. Baird and
95. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy
Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 754-64 (2004) (describing the theory).
96. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to
Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 651-59
(2003) (responding to Baird and Rasmussen's assertion that firms lack going-
concern value).
97. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 689 ("Each employee has
multiple relationships with each other and with the business's many suppliers
and customers. This vast web of relationships constitutes the firm.").
98. Id. at 687 ("The claim of The End of Bankruptcy was both that
financially distressed businesses typically have little or no going-concern
value.").
99. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy,
55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
100. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 699.
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Rasmussen argue, however, that technology has reduced
the replacement costs of these relationships and hence their
value.
As communication costs, transportation costs, and contracting
costs drop, it has become easier to produce goods without creating
a traditional business-or for there to be great value in preserving
an existing one. 1° 1
As transaction costs outside the firm go down, the upper bound on
the value of relationships inside the firm goes down as well.
10 2
The cost of a transaction, however, is not the cost of a
relationship. One must also take into account the number of
transactions necessary to create each relationship.
Communication, travel, and contracting-though less
expensive per unit-occur more frequently today. For
example, the sale of a telephone two decades ago was a
simple, one-shot transaction, but today the seller probably
needs to provide help lines. Increases in the number of
communications, travels, and contracts necessary to
maintain a single relationship may have entirely offset
declines in per unit costs. As the number of transactions
necessary to create each relationship with an employee,
customer, or supplier goes up, the upper bound on the value
of relationships of the firm goes up as well.
Were Baird and Rasmussen correct in their assertion
that the going-concern value of firms has been declining,
corresponding declines should have occurred in the number
and size of the companies seeking bankruptcy
reorganization. By almost any measure one might apply,
however, the numbers and sizes of large public companies
seeking to reorganize have been on an upward trend since
the creation of Chapter 11 in 1979.
101. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 360.
102. Id. at 361.
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Source: Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database.
Baird and Rasmussen argue that "[d]uring the 1980s,
nine out of ten large businesses entering Chapter 11 began
without a prepackaged or prenegotiated plan and emerged
as operating companies. By 2002, it was less than one in
four."10 3 But as I previously explained:
Their analysis shows that the proportion of cases I classified as (1)
reorganizations and (2) not prenegotiated or prepackaged has
fallen from 88% in the 1980s to 24% in 2002. The magnitude of
that drop in proportion is dramatic. However, the number of large
public firms completing Chapter 11 cases in 2002 was more tha[n]
10 times the annual average number in the 1980s. The 24% of
firms completing a nonprenegotiated reorganization in 2002-23
firms-is nearly three times the 88% of firms completing such a
reorganization each year in the 1980s-8 firms. The 16% of firms
completing nonsale, nonprenegotiated reorganizations by Baird
and Rasmussen's count-15 firms-is nearly double the annual
average number in the 1980s. Reorganizations have not
disappeared since the 1980s, they have doubled or tripled.10
4
103. Id. at 356.
104. LoPucki, supra note 96, at 648.
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Baird and Rasmussen's statistics are for an atypical
year. Calculated by year of plan confirmation, 2002 marked
the peak of the largest bankruptcy boom in history. Annual
plan confirmations (including liquidations and
reorganizations), which had been fifteen in 1998, reached
seventy-six in 2002 and then fell back to twenty-eight in
2005. The boom was in large part driven by sales of
companies, and so Baird and Rasmussen's statistics show a
large proportion of sales.
As the boom subsided, so did the proportion of sales.
The types of cases Baird and Rasmussen have marked for
extinction-companies that enter Chapter 11 without a
prepackaged or prenegotiated plan and emerge as operating
companies-have shown the smallest declines in the years
from 2003 to 2005. Baird and Rasmussen correctly state
that such cases constituted only 24% of large public-
company bankruptcies in 2002.105 But in the years 2003
through 2005, their proportion increased to 34% (fifty-seven
of 167).106 During those three years, ninety-three large
public companies successfully reorganized. 107 Fifty-seven of
them (61%) emerged under plans that were neither
prepackaged nor prenegotiated. 108 Of the nine largest
companies filing bankruptcy in 2005, none filed with the
announced intention of liquidating and none were
prepackaged or prenegotiated. 109 Whether one measures by
105. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 674 n.5.
106. See LoPucki, supra note 5. Of the 170 large public companies whose
cases were disposed of by U.S. bankruptcy courts in 2003 through 2005, three
could not be classified with respect to emergence. Of the 167 remaining, 74
(44%) did not emerge, 36 (22%) emerged as the result of prepackaged or
prenegotiated filings, and the remaining 57 (34%) emerged as the result of
filings that were neither prepackaged or prenegotiated.
107. Id. This study can be replicated using the "Design a Study" function on
the Bankruptcy Research Database website. In the First Step, item A, select
"disposed of in these years" and "2003, 2004, 2005." In the First Step, item K,
select each of the four choices that begin "company emerged." In the Third Step,
select "F. Plan Types." This yields the numbers of reorganizations. To obtain the
total number of reorganization plus liquidations, also check the "No company
emerged" box in the First Step, K. Refiling within five years.
108. Id.
109. See id. The nine largest cases were Refco (48.2 billion in assets),
Calpine ($27.2 billion in assets), Delta Air Lines ($21.6 billion in assets), Delphi
($16.4 billion in assets), Northwest Airlines ($13.9 billion in assets), Collins &
Aikman ($3.2 billion in assets), Tower Automotive ($2.9 billion in assets), and
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number or proportion, traditional bankruptcy
reorganization remains alive and well.
F. Professor David A. Skeel, Jr.
In his contribution to this symposium, David Skeel
starts from the assumption that he and co-author Kenneth
Ayotte have already proven U.S. bankruptcy court
competition to have been a success. Based on that success
Skeel recommends bankruptcy court competition for
Europe:
A second look at LoPucki's key findings in Courting Failure call
his interpretation of U.S. bankruptcy venue shopping into
question. The evidence further suggests that the first hints of
regulatory competition in Europe should be applauded rather than
condemned. 110
The foundation for this conclusion is in Ayotte and Skeel's
book review of Courting Failure forthcoming in the
University of Chicago Law Review.111
Skeel's conclusion is premature because the foundation
is flawed. Full exposition of the faults requires more space
than is available here, and so Doherty and I have written a
reply that will be published in the University of Chicago
Law Review. 112 Here, I merely sketch out the problems with
their critique and the nature of the evidence against it.
In their review, Ayotte and Skeel argue that (1) refiling
is sufficiently cheap that it may be economically efficient, 113
and (2) Delaware's high refiling rates result from Delaware
Winn-Dixie Stores ($2.7 billion in assets), American Business and Financial
Services ($1.1 billion in assets).
110. David A. Skeel, Jr., European Implications of Bankruptcy Venue
Shopping in the U.S., 54 BUFF. L. REV. 439 (2006).
111. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation
for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (2006)
(reviewing LoPucKi, supra note 2).
112. Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendancy, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
113. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 448 ("Even if the post-
bankruptcy performance of [nine Delaware-reorganized firms that refiled] were
perfectly foreseeable in advance, we could not conclude that the decision to
emerge from bankruptcy was economically inefficient."); id. at 451 ("[Rjefailure
is not a useful measure of the effectiveness of a bankruptcy procedure.").
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getting the weakest companies and putting them on "short
leashes" by deliberately loading them down with debt.114
The foundation for their argument is an economic model
and two new empirical studies.
The model-merely a set of assumptions about how
companies might be choosing courts-generates a selection
effect in which the weakest companies choose Delaware." 5
The engine driving that selection effect is that "[flirms with
weaker prospects should rationally choose a faster
reorganization, which the Delaware court provided."' 16 But
Ayotte and Skeel present not one shred of evidence-aside
from the failed reorganizations themselves-of the actual
existence of a selection effect. The evidence they do
present-their study of the EBITDA117 of emerging firms-
is convincing evidence that the companies choosing
Delaware were not weaker.118  Apparently unable to
discover evidence of such a selection effect, Ayotte and
Skeel proposed that the selection variable is of an
undiscoverable nature:
Although such simple observable measures might identify an
obvious selection effect, the failure to find obvious observable
differences driving both the filing decision and refailure does not
rule out the presence of selection. In most empirical studies of this
kind, researchers recognize the possibility of unobservable
differences and use econometric techniques (such as instrumental
variables) to eliminate them. In our own research, we have found
such an approach to be difficult, in part due to the small sample
size and the lack of plausible instruments. Given the inherent
difficulty involved, we believe it is sensible to acknowledge the
possibility that unobservable selection could be driving the results,
114. See id. at 449 ("[Flirms might be optimally kept 'on a short leash' to
shut down overspending on projects that are later determined to be
unprofitable.").
115. See id. at 437 ('The model provides support for the notion that all of
the patterns we see in the data could have resulted from a pure selection effect,
with firms with preexisting differences selecting into distress resolution
procedures that are best tailored to their circumstances.").
116. Id. at 462.
117. "EBITDA" is an acronym for "earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization."
118. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 452 (presenting data showing a
"negligible" difference between the EBITDA of firms emerging in Delaware and
firms emerging in Other Courts during the relevant period).
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especially since we have identified a plausible explanation for it in
our theoretical model, and anecdotal evidence from practitioners
indicates that the "tougher" cases often go to Delaware to take
advantage of the expertise of its judges.
119
In other words, Ayotte and Skeel are saying that we should
assume a selection effect exists in fact because (1) the
existence of one would fit their theory, and (2) some
unidentified practitioners-knowing that Delaware cases
fail more often-said that must have occurred because
Delaware cases were "tougher."
Their model fails to fit the existing evidence in several
other respects. It suggests that if Other Courts did cheap,
short reorganizations, the Other Courts' reorganizations
would have failed at Delaware rates.120 But Other Courts
did more than twenty-six reorganizations that were cheaper
and shorter than Delaware's twenty-six reorganizations
and the Other Court's twenty-six didn't fail at anywhere
near Delaware rates.121 The Ayotte/Skeel model attributes
Delaware's high refailure rate to prepackaging, 122 but the
evidence shows prepackaging led to refailure only in
Delaware. Seven of fourteen Delaware prepacks failed
(50%), but not a single one of the twelve Other Court
prepacks failed. 123 Ayotte and Skeel's model asserts that
weak companies chose cheap Delaware reorganizations in
the first round because they considered their chances of
survival to the second round to be low. 124 But the data
119. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 449 n.54.
120. The only basis Ayotte and Skeel provide in support of their assumption
that Delaware reorganization is cheaper is that Delaware reorganization is
faster. E.g., id. at 437 ("[T]he Delaware court (and the prepackaged bankruptcy,
regardless of venue) provides distressed firms with a forum to enact faster, and
hence less costly, workout procedures .... ).
121. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 13, at 1944-45.
122. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 441 ("Firms that are more likely to
underperform in the future, all else equal, will rationally select a cheaper,
faster bankruptcy procedure, like the procedure offered by Delaware courts
(particularly prepackaged cases) in the 1990s. A higher probability of
subsequent failure may result entirely from this selection effect . . ").
123. LoPucki, supra note 5 (showing twelve successful Other Court prepacks
for the period).
124. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 441 ("If the firm's future
prospects are poor . . . then a cheaper workout alternative is likely to be
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shows no statistically significant difference in the five-year
survival rates of Delaware and Other Court reorganizing
companies.125  Substantially the same proportion of
Delaware-reorganized companies survived to the second
round. In the Ayotte/Skeel model, companies that
reorganize in Delaware and fail are supposed to choose
Other Courts for their refilings, 126 but only five of the
eleven Delaware failures (45%) did.127
Ayotte and Skeel's new empirical studies also have
limitations. The first, a study of nine Delaware refilers,
purports to show that reorganization failure is virtually
costless. 28 Ayotte and Skeel reach this result by making
the questionable assumption that EBITDA is a better
measure of marginal losses than EBIT.129 In doing so, they
ignored the reasons I gave for using EBIT in the first
place.130 Contrary to their assertions, the depreciation and
amortization charges they would ignore do generally
represent cash expenditures.
Ayotte and Skeel's refiling-is-costless argument suffers
from a much larger flaw. The sole cost they consider, whole-
year operating losses between bankruptcies, is merely one
of many refiling costs. Costs they ignore include (1) partial-
year operating losses between bankruptcies, (2) the time
preferred, since part of the benefits of a full restructuring.., accrue only when
the firm survives.").
125. LoPucki, supra note 112.
126. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 441 ('"The underlying intuition is
that restructuring should be undertaken now if it is likely to be required later
in any case. . . . The more likely the firm is to fail, the greater are the gains to
waiting before attempting a full restructuring of operations.") (emphasis in
original). In mapping their model to the choice between Delaware and other
courts, a "restructuring" is a filing in an Other Court. See id. (referring to "a
cheaper, faster bankruptcy procedure, like the procedure offered by Delaware
courts .... ).
127. LoPucki, supra note 112.
128. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 111, at 440 ("[T]aking a closer look at
the data suggests that there is no evidence that X is positive."). "X" is the
"losses" between the two bankruptcies in Ayotte & Skeel's model. Id. at 439.
129. See id. at 445 ("[B]oth practitioners and academics commonly choose a
different measure of profitability called EBITDA. "). "EBIT" is an acronym
for "earnings before interest and taxes."
130. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes? A
Response to Professors Rasmussen, Thomas, and Skeel, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331,
337 n.23 (2001).
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value of all investments tied up in the company while it
flounders between bankruptcies, (3) the professional fees
and expenses incurred in the additional bankruptcy, and (4)
the loss of key employees, customers, market position, good
will, and credibility. When these costs are considered, it
seems likely that a 50% reorganization failure rate is too
costly to be efficient.
Despite these shortcomings, Ayotte and Skeel's review
makes important contributions to the court competition
debate. They have shown convincingly that Delaware
refilings were not so much the product of weak business
performance after emergence as excessive debt after
emergence. Although their economic model is inconsistent
with the data, a future modification of that model may not
be. The viability of their approach ultimately depends on
the cost of refiling. If that cost is negligible, as they
contend, a modified model will work. If that cost is
substantial, as I contend, it will not. Thus, Ayotte and
Skeel's efforts have set the agenda for future research.
Ultimately, I believe that research will show that Delaware
reorganization from 1991 through 1996 was just what it
appears to be: a catastrophic failure.
CONCLUSION
Whether you are a bankruptcy judge, a common
creditor, or an academic who believes that markets will
spontaneously arise and adjust to provide a happy ending to
every unregulated story, the bankruptcy court competition
is your worst nightmare. Federal judges are failing to
perform their statutory duties and being systematically
corrupted by the pressure to attract litigants. The
competition is destroying companies that could have
survived. The case placers are steadily increasing their
power over the bankruptcy courts.
Congress is not going to fix the problem any time soon.
At the conference in Madison, all seemed to agree that the
mechanism for political reform is broken. Regardless of the
desirability of bankruptcy venue reform, it cannot get
through the Senate. The bankruptcy courts are going to
twist in the wind while the competition runs its course.
That course may take an ugly turn, as four additional
Delaware judges begin trying to attract the cases they need
to keep working in Delaware.
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Understanding what happened in Delaware in the
period of its ascendency is crucial to an understanding of
the massive change in bankruptcy reorganization that
began during that period. By raising questions about the
existing research, this symposium has been an important
step in focusing future research. The fact that only 102
large public company reorganizations passed through the
bankruptcy courts during that period, together with the
expense of accessing the non-electronic court files of that
era, make direct investigation difficult. But as long as it
continues, the bankruptcy court competition will provide us
with a continuing flow of new data. If we can discover the
costs and determinants of reorganization failure from that
new data, we can examine the 1991 through 1996 data with
new eyes and perhaps solve the mystery of how competition
increases reorganized company failure rates. What is at
stake is nothing less than the future of bankruptcy
reorganization.
